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Introduction
On September 17, 2008, my mother received a call from her friend Danilo
Cabrera asking her for help. Danilo explained to her that he had been arrested by ICE
officials and was currently being detained in the Federal Building located in Downtown
Los Angeles. The next day my mother and I went to the Federal Building to see what
help he needed. At the Federal, officials led us to an underground facility where they
housed all the detainees before moving them to other detention facilities. When I saw
Danilo, he did not resemble the man I had come to know over the years. Danilo always
appeared like nothing could phase his tough exterior, however that day at the Federal
Building, I saw him cry for the first time in my life.
That day Danilo could not muster up the strength to put on a brave face because
he was overwhelmed with fear of what would happen to him. Danilo was afraid of the jail
that they were going to send him, afraid of being sent back to Guatemala and most
importantly afraid of what would happen to his family if he got deported. Danilo begged
my mother for help and to use what money he had accumulated so that she could find
him a lawyer to prevent him from being deported. It took 45 days until he was released
from federal custody so that he could argue his case before a judge and as of today
Danilo is still arguing his case trying to attain permanent residency status. Danilo is one
of a handful of individuals that are lucky enough to be allowed to stay in the United
States because recently this has been a period of unmatched immigration enforcement.
According to the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration
Statistic, California accounts for approximately 2,600,000 illegal immigrants in 2009.
This number represents about 25 percent of the entire estimated illegal immigrant

population in the United States, which is roughly 10.8 million. Between 2003 and 2008,
the U.S. government removed 1,446,338 noncitizens 1 from the United States. 2 Never
before had the United States removed so many noncitizens in such a short period of time.
Some individuals choose to leave by their own free will after receiving their notice of
removal because they believe they have no chance of attaining citizenship. Another factor
that has lead to the spike in deportation of noncitizens is the increase of federal
prosecutions of immigration crimes in criminal courts. Over the past five years,
immigration crimes have become a top priority for federal prosecutors and currently
make up more than half of the federal criminal docket. 3 However, of the hordes of
noncitiizens that were sent back to their countries of origin, how many deserved to be
removed?
In recent years, ICE and CBP have been delegating powers to law enforcement
agents outside of the immigration enforcement bureaucracy - including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and numerous state
and local law enforcement agencies - to increase the efficiency of apprehending illegal
immigrants. 4 The procedures that immigration officers and other cooperating law
enforcement officials engage in enforcing immigration laws are similar to the ones
conducted during criminal investigations. For instance, they conduct brief stops of
individuals suspected of immigration violations; full arrest upon probable cause of these
violations; consensual questioning; and, with cause, interrogations concerning

1

A noncitizen is a foreign-born person who is not a naturalized U.S. citizen. Noncitizens may be in the country legally on a permanent
or temporary visa (tourist, business, or student) or may be in the country illegally.
2
Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 95 (2008), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2008/ois_yb_2008.pdf.
3
John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Spike in U.S. Cases, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2009,
4
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST),
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/080226best_fact_sheet.htm

immigration status. 5 However in the process of investigating immigration violations and
detaining noncitizens, police officials have violated the rights of noncitizens.
During a criminal trial a noncitizen could raise allegations of constitutional rights
violations, and if a violation was established, he might well be able to argue that evidence
illegally obtained in violation of these constitutional protections need to be suppressed.
However, of in hundreds of thousands of cases each year, noncitizens are processed not
in criminal courts, but in civil courts.
Due to the changed that have been enacted by the federal government over the
years it has transformed the nature of immigration enforcement. Today many of the
interactions between police officials and noncitizens in the United States are not dealt in
criminal courts but in immigration courts. However, even though the nature of
immigration enforcement has evolved, immigration courts have not changed to deal with
the “growing challenge of overseeing ongoing and widespread interagency immigration
policing in the United States.” Not only do immigration judges face lack of resources to
deal with the massive influx of immigration cases brought before their docket, but also
they are limited as to what kinds of remedies they can provide in cases where an
individuals rights have been violated. This thesis explores the California Immigration
Enforcement system from the programs established to apprehend illegal aliens in the
United States, the rights illegal aliens are granted, the detention facilities where they
reside and the immigration courts that ultimately decide their fate. The question that is
being asked is whether the current system established works or if reform is needed.

5

Stephen H. Legomsky & Cristina M. Rodriguez, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy at 649-50 (5th ed. 2009).

Chapter 1:
Immigration Enforcement
A. Background
The U.S. Constitution says, that the authority to create laws as to which aliens may
enter the United States and which aliens may be removed belongs solely with the federal

government, and in particular with Congress. 6 The federal government also has the
power to proscribe activities that subvert this system and to establish penalties for those
who undertake prohibited activities. These powers have primarily been implemented
through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). 7 The INA establishes a
comprehensive set of requirements for legal immigration, naturalization, and the removal
of aliens, as well as rules governing aliens’ continued presence in the United States.
Before the INA was enacted, immigration laws were mandated by a variety of statutes
but were scattered through various laws and provisions. In 1952, the McCarran-Walter
Bill of 1952, Public Law No. 82-414, collected and codified many existing provisions
and reorganized the structure of immigration law. Although it stands alone as a body of
law, the Act is also contained in Title 8 of the United States Code. To enforce the laws
and provisions under this act, the INA created the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS).
The INS served as the federal agency that enforced these laws for the remainder
of the 20th century focusing on Interior Enforcement and Border Enforcement. Interior
enforcement is focused on deterring illegal immigration, prevent immigration related
crimes, and removing those illegally in the United States. The Departments that are
responsible for immigration interior enforcement functions are the Office of
Investigations (OI) and the Office of Detention and Removal (DRO). 8 OI is responsible
for addressing smuggling and trafficking in aliens, benefit fraud, responding to
community complaints of illegal immigrations, and worksite enforcement. DRO is
responsible transporting aliens from point to point, to keep them in custody while their
6

U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3-4.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101
8
Alison Siskin, Andorra Bruno,Blas Nunez-Neto, Lisa M. Seghetti, and Ruth Ellen Wasem. Immigration Enforcement Within the
United States. CRS Report For Congress. April 6, 2006
7

cases are being processed and to remove them from the United States when so ordered.
Border enforcement includes inspections at ports of entry (POEs) and the patrolling of
areas between POEs. In 1994, the USBP strategy to deter illegal entry was “prevention
through deterrence,” 9 meaning they would raise the risk of being apprehended to the
point where aliens would find it futile to try to enter. The strategy called for placing
USBP resources and personnel directly at the areas where illegal immigrants cross so that
they can detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between
official points of entry. 10
On March 1, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security opened, replacing the
INS. Within the Department, three different agencies now handle the responsibilities
formerly held by the INS. Those agencies are the U.S. Customs and Border Enforcement
(CBE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). Currently, the CBE handles border patrol duties, the USCIS
handles matters that concern with naturalization, asylum, and permanent residency, and
ICE handles deportation, intelligence, and investigatory functions.

11

B. The Transformation of Immigration Enforcement
In the past century, efforts placed on Immigration enforcement have fluctuated
back and forth but recently the U.S. government has seen it as a much higher priority and
has given it much more resources than it has done so in the past. According to the
Homeland Security’s 2009 Budget in Brief 12 , the U.S. government invested billions of

9

Id.
Id.
11
Id.
12
U.S.ID DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 19 (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2009.pdf.
10

dollars on immigration enforcement activities. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) had a budget of $5,676,085,000 13 , Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had a
budget of $10,941,231,000 14 and in total, these two agencies had an operating budgets
over $15 billion in fiscal year 2009. 15 The $15 billion budget for the two agencies
represent a budget increase of over 500 percent in the past 10 years and more than a
1,500 percent increase since 1988. 16
However, the figures in the DHS Budget do not represent all the federal costs of
immigration enforcement. The budget only reflects the spending that is done on
investigations, detention and removal but do not show the spending done on prosecuting
and punishing immigration crimes in criminal court. The 2009 DHS Budget Brief shows
that a very considerable amount of resources are still devoted to border enforcement, but
over the past decade, interior enforcement has been given much more focus than it has
gotten before. For instance, before the DHS took over and INS was in charge of
immigration enforcement, they had fewer than two thousand agents to enforce
immigration laws in the interior of the United States. 17 Today in 2010, ICE has 20,000
employees committed to internal enforcement endeavors. 18
Along with an increase in size, the strategy for conducting interior enforcement
has also changed. The new enforcement strategy has come to rely heavily upon thousands
of state and local law enforcement agents who assist in interior immigration enforcement.

13

Id
Id
15
Id.
16
JUSTICE MGMT. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA: FROM 1975 THROUGH THE PRESIDENT’S
2003 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS 104–08 (2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf
17
LISA M. SEGHETTI, STEPHEN R. VIÑA & KARMA ESTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCING IMMIGRATION
LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT 6 (2005), available at
http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2005,1026-crs.pdf.
18
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE FISCAL YEAR 2010
ENACTED BUDGET 1 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/ news/factsheets/2010budgetfactsheet.doc.
14

As Julia Preston wrote in her article “No Need for a Warrant, You’re an Immigrant”,
“over the last two years, ICE has grown more aggressive, entering factories and
communities, hunting down foreign fugitives ranging from convicted criminals to
workers whose visas have expired.” 19 This transformation has made immigration
enforcement an addition to, if not a replacement for, criminal law enforcement in matters
involving noncitizens.

C. The Criminalization of Immigration
Historically, U.S. legal doctrines have classified deportation as a civil punishment
and thus does not require the full spectrum of criminal procedural protection that are
provided in criminal trials. However with the increase in focus on interior enforcement
and the network of various law enforcement agencies that are aiding in immigration
enforcement, it has brought questions regarding clarification between immigration law
and criminal law enforcement.
Dan Kanstroom in his book “Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American
History,” has noted that much has changed in the way the United States conducts
immigration enforcement. Kanstroom notes that there used to be limitations on
deportation, such as when a noncitizen was in the United States after a year, they were no
longer able to be deported. Today deportation is being used as an addition to criminal
punishment working as a means of “post-entry social control.” 20 Also, when an
immigrant, even one that is here legally, commits certain offenses, they might face
deportation along with criminal punishment. As a result of this change in the nature of
19

Julia Preston, No Need for a Warrant, You’re an Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, October 14, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/weekinreview/14preston.html
20
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION, 243

immigration enforcement it has led for the need of clarification.
There are those that believe that immigration enforcement is overstepping its
boundaries as it is being used increasingly in the interior as a way to achieve criminal law
enforcement goals. The immigration penalties such as detention and removal are
considered more of a criminal punishment but immigration enforcement is only
designated to deal in civil matters. This blurred line between criminal law and
immigration law has created what Juliet Stumpf in her article “The Crimmigration Crisis:
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power”, calls “Crimmigration” law, “in which
immigration law and the criminal justice system are merely nominally separate.” 21 The
overlap between the two systems have presented itself in forms of an increase in
prosecution of immigration crimes, the use of civil removal system as a replacement for
criminal punishment, and the use of criminal punishment in civil immigration affairs. 22
In the past decade U.S., federal law enforcement has seen a rise in immigration
prosecutions. According to recent data, immigration related crimes make up half of
federal criminal cases. 23 The most common immigration crimes that are prosecuted are
illegal and felony reentry but other immigration crimes such as documentation fraud and
human smuggling are also increasing. Today immigration prosecutions have surpassed
federal drug and weapons prosecutions, and making other forms of prosecutions seem not
important. 24
Recently state and certain districts of the U.S. are taking it upon themselves to
create laws and statues to deal with immigration enforcement. Originally, it was intended
21

Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006).
Jennifer M. Chacon. A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. 59
Duke Law Journal. 1563
23
Schwartz, supra note 5
24
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, PROSECUTION OF IMMIGRATION CASES SURGE IN U.S. WHILE SENTENCES
SLUMP (2005), available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131/
22

for the federal government to be the only one to regulate immigration and enforce
immigration laws but certain states feel that the federal government is not doing their job
and therefore have a legitimate claim to fix the problems in their domain. Arizona and is
one example where a state has took it upon themselves to deal with their immigration
problems.
In April 23, 2010, Arizona enacted SB 1070 to deal with illegal immigrants. Their
new law would make it a state misdemeanor crime for a noncitizen to be in Arizona
without carrying the required documents, bars state or local officials or agencies from
restricting enforcement of federal immigration laws, and cracks down on those sheltering,
hiring and transporting illegal aliens. These laws have become the state and local
governments solution to deal with their immigration problems.
Since 1990, Congress has been enacting numerous acts and statues that once any
noncitizen has been convicted of certain types of criminal offenses, those criminal
convictions become the basis for their removal from the U.S. in civil removal
proceedings. When Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act it specified that
noncitizens convicted of irritated felonies could be deported. Then in 1996 when
congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, it greatly expand the definition of
“aggravated felonies,” 25 and added to the list of offenses that would result in the
deportation of a noncitizen and eliminated the ability of an immigration judge to provide
relief from deportation in cases in which the equities favored that relief.
Finally, even when there is no need for criminal enforcement, the methods that

25

INA § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)

the government employs to deal with civil immigration matters resemble criminal
punishment. For instance, ICE officials perform militarized raids in both criminal and
civil matters, “[ICE] home raids generally involve teams of heavily armed ICE agents
making predawn tactical entries into homes, purportedly to apprehend some high priority
target believed to be residing therein. ICE has admitted that these are warrantless raids
and, therefore, that any entries into homes require the informed consent of residents.
However, frequent accounts in the media and in legal filings have told a similar story of
constitutional violations occurring during ICE home raids—a story that includes ICE
agents breaking into homes and seizing all occupants without legal basis.”26 The
Department of Homeland Security also places many immigrants who are either trying to
establish their claim for residency or contest their deportation orders, in detention
facilities. Immigrants who are awaiting the completion-and in some cases, the start-of
their civil removal proceedings are often placed in the same facilities as criminal
offenders and are subjected to the same harsh treatment.
This combination of immigration law and criminal law and the manifestations that
result from it has led to the criminalization of immigration in the United States. Also
because the distinction between immigration enforcement and criminal enforcement
continues to become harder to tell apart, the role of local law enforcement in immigration
matters has increased. Today, local law enforcement officials who have previously had
very little part in immigration enforcement, play a major role in immigration control
efforts.

26

CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS (2009), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/
uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/IJC_ICE-Home-Raid-

Chapter 2:
Immigration Enforcement in California

1. The Rise of law enforcement in Immigration Control
In 1996, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum that outlined what that
state and local officials could do to enforce civil immigration laws. 27 The memorandum
declared it was not in the domain of state and local officials to detain any alien based on
their status of citizenship without proper authorization because it is a civil offense, not
criminal. 28 However, officials could arrest a noncitizen if the officials had probable cause
to suspect that the noncitizen committed a criminal offense, such as illegal reentry or
alien smuggling, because it is in their jurisdiction. 29
Later that year, Congress expanded the power of state and local law enforcement
agencies so they could have more powers to enforce immigration laws. The first
expanded power was through the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) of 1996 that gave police officials the authority to arrest and detain noncitizens
who are unlawfully present in the U.S. and who had “previously been convicted of a

27

NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, BACKGROUNDER: IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 1 (2004),
available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/ images/uploads/Backgrounder-StateLocalEnforcement.pdf.
28
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRIMINALIZING UNLAWFUL PRESENCE: SELECTED ISSUES 2 (2006), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/ P585.pdf
29
Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 26, 32 (1996)

felony in the Untied States.” 30 Second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) allowed the then attorney general who is now the secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security to authorize local police authorities to enforce
civil immigration laws when “an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens...presents
urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response.” 31 Finally, the IIRIRA
added Section 287 (g) to the Immigration Nationality Act that allowed the attorney
general to empower state and local police with immigration enforcement authority.
After September 11, 2001, it became unclear what authority state and local
agencies had in enforcing immigration laws, particularly in civil matters. For instance,
The Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department under Attorney General John
Ashcroft revised the 1996 memorandum that outlines state and local power in
immigration enforcement and added that they had an “inherent authority” to arrest and
detain immigration violators, including civil violators.32 However, the revised
memorandum was not immediately released because it was then changed by the then
White House Consel Alberto Gonzeles saying that states and local police had not an
“inherent authority,” but just an authority “to arrest and detain persons who are in
violation of immigration laws and whose names have been placed in the National Crime
Information Center [NCIC). 33
The ongoing debate concerning immigration policy, combined with the public's fear
about immigrant involvement in criminal activity, 34 and the current correctional crisis in

30

AEDPA, 8 U.S.C. §1252c (2006)
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10)
32
Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute (June 24,
2002), available at http://www.migration policy.org/files/whitehouse.pdf;
33
Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute,
34
Kristin F. Butcher et al., Crime, Corrections, and California: What Does Immigration Have to Do with It?,
31

California 35 - have led to the blending of federal immigration and national security
policies with state and local correctional policies. 36

2. ICE ACCESS Programs

ICE has grouped the major problems that merge immigration enforcement with
the criminal justice system under an umbrella called Agreements of Cooperation in
Communities to Enhance Safety and Security (ACCESS). The ICE ACCESS initiative
was developed to promote the various programs that ICE offers to assist state, local and
tribal law enforcement agencies. 37 Under this initiative, ICE works closely with other law
enforcement agencies to identify an agency’s specific needs and the local communities
unique concerns. Before creating a ICE ACCESS partnership with a local agency ICE
representative will meet with the agency the requests to be part of the partnership in order
to asses each agencies local needs and decide what type of program will be most
beneficial and sustainable. ICE has organized a number of operations under the spectrum
of its ACCESS program, the three programs that are most employed in California are the
Section 287 (g) Agreements, Criminal Alien Program (CAP), and Secure Communities.
A. Section 287 (g) Agreements
One of the broadest grants of authority for state and local immigration
enforcement activity stems from §133 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant

35

Matthew Yi, Assembly OKs Stripped Down Prison Bill, S.F. Chron., Sept. 1, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/09/01/MN8219GELN.DTL.
36
Tom Barry, Helping Defenders Effectively Represent Noncitizens: Criminal Alien Funding and the Immigrant-Based Criminal
Justice Complex (May 13, 2009) http://defending immigrants.org/news/article.251252
Criminal_Alien_Funding_and_the_ImmigrantBased_Criminal_Justice_Complex?print=1
37
Immigration Enforcement Within the United States Supra note 8

Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which amended INA § 287 to permit the delegation
of certain immigration enforcement functions to state and local officers. According to the
INA § 287(g), the Attorney General (now the Secretary of Homeland Security) is
authorized
“to enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an
officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the [Secretary of Homeland Security]
to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation,
apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across
State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political
subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law”. 38

This meant that any agreements entered into 287(g) agreements, enabled specially
trained state or local officers to perform specific functions relative to the investigation,
apprehension, or detention of aliens, during a predetermined time frame and under federal
supervision. In order for state or local officers to perform functions according to a 287(g)
agreement, they must “have knowledge of and adhere to” federal law governing
immigration officers and be certified as having received “adequate training” regarding
the enforcement of immigration laws. To prevent any lawsuits brought against the federal
government, the 287 (g) agreements does not grant state and local police officials the
status of federal employees but instead are to be considered as agents acting under the
authority of the ICE. 39
The program operates under one of three models. Under the jail model, correctional
officers in state prisons or local jails screen those arrested or convicted of crimes by
accessing federal databases in order to ascertain the arrestee’s immigration status. Under
38
39

INA § 287(g)(1),
INA § 287(g)(7)-(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2)-(8).

the broader task force model, law enforcement officers participating in criminal task
forces screen arrested individuals during the course of performing their regular policing
duties. Finally, ICE has allowed some local law enforcement agencies to concurrently
implement both models, in an arrangement referred to as the joint model. . 40
Los Angeles County was the first county in California to sign a 287(g)
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with ICE, on February 1, 2005. 41 As of 2008, Los
Angeles, Costa Mesa, Orange, Riverside and San Bernardino Counties have 287(g)
programs. 42 The agreements between each law enforcement agency and ICE vary
slightly in terms of powers granted. The Los Angeles County MOA, as an example,
addresses the enforcement of immigration in jail settings. Los Angeles sheriffs that have
been trained under the agreement are able to question any detainee about their
immigration status, consider evidence to support deportation, prepare detainers,
administer immigration oaths, take sworn statements from detainees and prepare notice to
appear applications. They can also notify ICE about the presence of any undocumented
immigrant, legal permanent resident, or asylee that is in their custody or in the criminal
justice system; ICE can then deport them. 43
Almost all cities in Southern California have refrained from signing 287(g)
agreements, and some cities have policies prohibiting excessive immigration enforcement
(e.g. the Los Angeles Police Department’s Special Order 40 44 ). However, noncitizens
who are detained by police in areas with more favorable immigration policies such as Los

40

Cynthia Buiza, The 287 (g) Program in Southern California. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles. November
2008
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Special Order 40 is a policy established in Los Angeles in 1979. Special Order 40 prohibits police officers from "initiat(ing) police
action with the objective of discovering the alien status of a person." This prevents officers from inquiring about the immigration
status of an individual and from contacting federal immigration officials about an individual's immigration status.
41

Angeles are often moved to county-run jail facilities where immigrants are screened for
immigration law violations. Thus, even when local police have strong relationships with
immigrant communities, these bonds may be undermined by fears of being placed in a
county facility.
According to the Los Angeles Times, from February 2005 to June 2008, the Los
Angeles County Sheriffs interviewed 20,000 inmates and referred 10,840 people to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for possible deportation 45 . In addition, the
Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) reports that during fiscal year 2008, ICE
officers and sheriffs’ department personnel in the seven- county southern California
region processed a total of 35,562 immigrants for deportation—12% higher than in the
previous year. While not all of this figure can be attributed to the 287(g) program,OCSD
suggests that roughly a third were identified by local sheriffs departments.

Officials working under 287(g) programs are allowed to refer people to ICE for
any violation of the law. The 287(g) program makes no distinction between people who
have committed serious felonies and people who have committed non-violent low level
misdemeanor crimes. In San Bernardino County, officers have begun to report people
who were trying to serve their community service time for misdemeanor crimes to ICE.
This means that they are effectively punishing people for trying to rectify the minor
crimes they may have committed, and who are cooperating with the system. Because an
undocumented individual might be deported for any small or petty crime, there is
increased fear of law enforcement and a disincentive for immigrants to collaborate with
or contact local law enforcement to report crimes.
45

ELIZABETH VENABLE, COALITION FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF LOS ANGELES, LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND IMMIGRATION: THE 287(G) PROGRAM OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, FACTSHEET (2008),

http://chirla.org/files/287g%20Factsheet%2011-24-08.pdf.

B.Criminal Alien Program
The Criminal Alien Program focuses on identifying "criminal aliens" 46 who are
detained in federal, state, and local facilities and seeks their removal prior to their release
from criminal custody. 47 This program begins with local police and jails collecting placeof-birth information from individuals at arrest or upon booking into jail. 48 This
information is shared with ICE's Office of Detention and Removal Operation ("DRO"),
whose officers screen and interview the identified individuals. 49 Upon the initial
suspicion that an individual may be a noncitizen, including a lawful permanent resident
who may be subject to removal from the United States, a "detainer" or immigration
"hold" is placed on the individual, preventing his or her release until custody is
transferred ICE. 50 A person can be transferred to ICE at any point in the criminal process,
even if they are not charged or convicted of an offense. 51 In California, individuals who
are convicted and sentenced and have an ICE hold placed on him or her are transferred to
ICE custody after completion of their California sentence. 52 Upon taking of custody, ICE
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either transports the prisoner to a detention center pending immigration proceedings or
immediately removes them from the country. 53

C. Secure Communities
In March 2008, ICE announced a new federal local joint immigration enforcement
program Secure Communities: A comprehensive plan to identify and remove criminal
aliens. 54 Secure communities is essentially a technology intensive version of the Criminal
Alien Program that allows instantaneous information sharing among local jails, ICE and
the FBI. The critical elements of the program is that during booking in jail, the arrestee's
fingerprints will be simultaneously checked against DHS database and the FBI criminal
databases to screen their criminal history and immigration record. If there is a fingerprint
match then the system automatically notifies ICE and the locality where they have
flagged the possible suspect. Local law enforcement must give ICE officials 48 hours
notice before releasing a noncitizen that was flagged in the system. ICE then determines
the appropriate actions that must be taken.
The initial purpose of the program was removing the "worst" criminal offenders
who are in the country illegally. Los Angeles County joined the secure communities
program in late August 2009. In the first two months secure communities were used, law
enforcement agencies made 78,895 submissions resulting in 8,717 matches. From
October 2009 until the end of February, immigration officials arrested or issued detainers
against 21,556 people nationwide who were identified as being in the country illegally
and charged or convicted of crimes. Of those individuals that were identified 4,523 were
53
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arrested on suspicion of or convicted of violent crimes - such as murder, rape and
kidnapping. About 14,741 have already been removed from the country. Some have been
identified but not yet removed; they are completing their sentences. 55
The new program is more accurate because all inmates, not just those who say
they are foreign-born, are now screened for immigration status As of March, 10,
California counties were using the program to identify illegal immigrants in jails,
including Imperial, Los Angeles and Sacramento counties. There are 119 other counties
in the nation already using the system; Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials
hope to launch the program in all counties by 2013. 56
All modes of cooperation that directly involves state and local police officials in
civil immigration matters, whether it is through the various programs of the ICE
ACCESS Program, ultimately leads to the fundamental change of immigration
enforcement. The changes in immigration enforcement not only affect law enforcement
agencies but also affect other aspects of the immigration enforcement system such as the
detaining of illegal immigrants and the immigration courts.
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Chapter 3:
Detention and Immigration Court
1. Detention
A. ICE Hold
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is housing
thousands of inmates for whom the ICE has placed a hold, a first step toward deporting
these inmates when they have completed their sentences. According to the data compiled
from the CDCR, it is currently housing 15,800 inmates identified as ICE hold ( also
known as “detainers” or “hold”). Of the inmates that have ICE holds on them,
approximately 9,500 inmates eligible for deportation. After an ICE hold is placed on a
noncitizen, upon completion of the inmates California sentence, ICE takes custody of the
inmate and transports them to a deportation center. If the inmate has been previously

deported or has been convicted of an aggravated felony and does not contest the
proceeding and the inmate is from a country with a Prisoner Transfer Treaty, then they
are deported without a hearing. About 60-70 percent of the ICE cases meet these criteria.
If the inmate contests the deportation then they are transferred to the deportation center. 57
B. Facilities
The conditions and terms of immigration detention centers are equivalent to
prison, where freedom of movement is restricted, detainees wear prison uniforms, and are
kept in a punitive setting. To house all the detainees, detention centers uses a combination
of facilities owned and operated by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
the enforcement bureau within DHS, along with prison facilities owned and operated by
private prison contractors and local and county jails that ICE rents beds from on a
reimbursable basis. 58 Only half of immigrants held in detention have actual criminal
records yet the majority of them are held in jails where non-criminal immigrants are
mixed with the prison’s criminal population. 59
Immigrants may remain detained for months or even years as they go through
process to decide whether they are eligible to stay in the U.S. or until they are issued a
final order of removal, as the U.S. arranges for their deportation. Immigrants in detention
include asylum-seekers, torture survivors, victims of human trafficking, long-term
permanent residents, the sick, the elderly, pregnant women, parents of US citizen children
and families. For all immigrant detainees, ICE reported an average stay of 64 days in
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2003, with 32 percent detained for 90 days or longer. 60 Certain exception such as asylumseekers, who are eventually granted asylum, spend an average of 10 months in detention,
with the longest period being 3.5 years. 61 Some individuals who have final orders of
removal, such as those from countries with whom the U.S. does not have diplomatic
relations or those from countries that refuse to accept the return of their own nationals,
may languish in detention indefinitely. 62 Before any immigrant can be removed from the
United States they are taken to immigration court where they decide if they can remain in
the United States or have to be sent back to their country of origin.
2. Immigration Court
A. Background
Immigration Judges and Immigration Court do not operate as members of the
Judicial Branch of the government. The federal government reasons that because many of
the issues that are discussed in this courtroom often involve “especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.” 63 Also, the courts recognize that
the decisions permitting or preventing foreign nationals from immigrating are “frequently
of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive [Branch] than
the Judiciary.” 64 Therefore the Executive Branch is responsible for the creation of policy
and procedures relating to immigration proceedings.
The Executive Branch has entrusted the responsibility of immigration laws to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) since 1940 and is delegated to the Attorney General. As of
today, immigration judges are members of the Department of Justice’s Executive Office
60
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of Immigration Review (EOIR). From the authority granted by the DOJ, the EOIR
“interprets and administers” immigration law by “conducting immigration court
proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings.” 65 The spectrum of EOIR
includes the Office of the Director, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) and the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing
Officer. The OCIJ is in charge of the immigration courts located around the country.
B. Due Process Rights
Regardless of status in the United States, immigrants have various rights protected
under the U.S. Constitution and local, state, and federal laws. Some people assume that
noncitizens have no rights under the U.S. Constitution because they lack citizenship but
they are mistaken. due to provisions under the U.S. Constitution that refer to “persons”
rather than “citizens” apply to individuals regardless of immigration status. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “these provisions are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality.” 66 Immigrants in the U.S. are considered “persons” within the
territorial jurisdiction for purposes of constitutional protections regardless of how they
entered the U.S. or whether they have lawful immigration status. 67
The U.S. Constitution bestows certain procedural protections for individuals that
are subject to criminal investigations, prosecution and punishment. These protections are
the one provided under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eight Amendments from the Bill of
rights. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from self-incrimination and provides
65
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them due process, the Sixth Amendment grants individual the right to counsel and finally
the Eighth Amendment protects individuals against cruel and unusual punishment. These
protection are provided to both citizens and non citizens during criminal procedures.
Because state action is involved in the enforcement of immigration law, both
criminal and civil, constitutional protections apply. However, the protections available in
civil proceedings have been distinguished from the protections available in criminal
proceedings. So, although the Constitution’s provisions apply to state officials enforcing
immigration law, the extent of applicable rights and the remedies for violations of
constitutional rights is much different in the civil immigration context than in the
criminal context. 68
In civil courts, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amendment still apply to
noncitizens, except with some limitations. The Fourth Amendment still protects
noncitizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, but the protections are much
more narrower in immigration enforcement than in the criminal context. For instance, in
immigration enforcement, remedies are not provided. The Fifth Amendment protections
against self incrimination does not apply in civil proceedings because that rights is only
limited to those who are accused in criminal courts. Noncitizens also do not have a
constitutional right to counsel at the government’s expense in civil removal proceedings
because as it was decided in Zakonaite v. Wolf (1912), that proceedings to enforce
immigration regulations do not involve Sixth Amendment Protections. 69 However, even
though they are not provided counsel, noncitizens do have a statutory right, under the
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INA, to supply counsel at their own expense. 70 Finally, the Eighth Amendment protection
from cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to deportation because as it was held
in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, “deportation is not a punishment for crime.” 71

C. Court Procedures
The process of the immigration court begins when the Department of Homeland
Security sends an individual a “notice to appear”. The “notice to appear” signifies that the
individual is in the country illegally, their visa has expired, or they have committed a
deportable criminal offenses. Deportation proceedings can be initiated by against legal
permanent residents and illegal aliens. Unlike in criminal court proceedings, aliens who
are being deported through an immigration court do not have a right to hire a free public
defender and are usually recommended by the judge to acquire counsel to represent them.
Gene Hays, immigration attorney in Los Angeles, expressed that it was very crucial for
anybody that was going to immigration court to have an attorney represent them. The
reason Mr. Hays said it is necessary for an individual to acquire an immigration attorney
instead of self representation is because the immigration law and immigration court
procedures are usually complex and difficult to understand, especially for immigrants
who cannot even speak English fluently. Mr. Hays also said that by having a competent
attorney that is well versed in immigration law, the individual would have a better chance
of winning their case and either getting a green card returned or end up getting a green
card through the court.
U.S. immigration law requires that the alien who has an appointment with
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immigration curt, attend every one of their hearings regardless of whether the individual
has an immigration attorney to represent them. If the individual fails to appear at their
hearing without a valid excuse then the immigration court judge will issue a deportation
order. Once the deportation order is issued, the immigration officer will have the
authority to go into an individuals residence to arrest and deport them.

D. Seeking Relief
Once a noncitizen in proceedings is found to be removable, they may request one
or more types of discretionary relief: Voluntary Departure, Cancelation of Removal,
Asylum, Adjustment, or Adjustment of Status. The noncitizen has the burden of proving
that they are eligible for relief under the law, and usually that they deserves such relief as
an exercise of discretion. 72
i. Voluntary Departure
Voluntary departure is the most common form of relief from removal and may be
granted by Immigration Judges. Voluntary departure allows a noncitizen that would have
eventually been removed from the U.S., to depart the United States at his or her own
personal expense and return to his or her home country, or another country if the
individual can secure an entry there. Immigration Judges will provide aliens information
on the availability of this form of relief when taking pleadings. 73 It is important to note
that aliens granted voluntary departure must depart within the time specified by the
Immigration Judge. Although an Immigration Judge has the ability to set a shorter
deadline, aliens granted voluntary departure prior to the completion of removal
72
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proceedings must depart within 120 days, and those granted such relief at the conclusion
of removal proceedings must depart within 60 days. 74

i. Cancellation of Removal
This form of discretionary relief is available to qualifying lawful permanent residents and
qualifying non-permanent residents. For lawful permanent residents, cancellation of
removal may be granted if the individual:
•

Has been a lawful permanent resident for at least 5 years;

•

Has continuously resided in the United States for at least 7 years after having been
lawfully admitted; and

•

Has not been convicted of an “aggravated felony,” a term that is more broadly
defined within immigration law than the application of the term “felony” in nonimmigration settings. 75

Cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents may be granted if the alien:
•

Has been continuously present for at least 10 years;

•

Has been a person of good moral character during that time;

•

Has not been convicted of an offense that would make him or her removable; and

•

Demonstrates that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship to his or her immediate family members (limited to the alien’s spouse,
parent, or child) who are either U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.

iii. Asylum
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Under section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney
General can grant asylum to an alien who qualifies as a “refugee.” The Refugee Act of
1980 and certain parts that were taken and modified and placed into the INA establishes
that “Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the
United States…irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum. Political
Asylum is an immigration benefit that if granted would lead to permanent residency in
the United States and is based on the applicants ability to show that the they have a well
founded fear of persecution in their country of origin on account of: race, religion,
nationality, or membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Persecution is
defined as a severe form of discrimination, harassment torture, or any other type of harm
that’s being committed against the asylum applicant by the government of his country of
origin. However, an alien may be ineligible for asylum under certain circumstances,
including having failed to file an asylum application within an alien’s first year of arrival
in the United States, being convicted of an aggravated felony, or having been found to be
a danger to national security. 76
iii. Adjustment of Status
This form of discretionary relief is available to change an alien’s status from a
non-immigrant to a lawful permanent resident. Aliens who have been previously
admitted into the United States can apply to DHS for adjustment of status, while aliens in
removal proceedings apply before an Immigration Judge. Several conditions must be met,
including that the alien is admissible for permanent residence and an immigrant visa is
immediately available at the time of application. Aliens who qualify for visas allowing an
adjustment of status are often petitioned for by a spouse, family member, or an
76
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employer. 77
E.Appeal
If an individual feels that there is new crucial evidence in their case that was previously
unavailable or if the individual feels that the immigration judge or their lawyer made
serious mistakes in the case that caused them to lose the case, then the individual may
have reasons to appeal the judge’s decision. An alien may move to reopen or to
reconsider a previous decision by filing a timely motion with an Immigration Judge or the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The central purpose of a motion to reopen is to
introduce new and additional evidence that is material and that was unavailable at the
original hearing. A motion to reconsider seeks a reexamination of the decision based on
alleged errors of law and facts. 78
Unless an exception applies, a party may file only one motion to reopen and one
motion to reconsider. With a few exceptions, a motion to reopen proceedings must be
filed within 90 days of the final removal order, while a motion to reconsider must be filed
within 30 days of the date of the final order. The filing of such motions does not suspend
the execution of the removal decision unless a stay is ordered by the Immigration Judge,
the BIA, DHS, or the alien seeks to reopen an in absentia order (a decision made when
the alien was absent at the proceeding). 79
Chapter 4:
Problem With California’s Immigration System
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1. Court System
Peter Levinson, wrote in his article, “A Specialized Courts for Hearing and
Appeals” in 1981,
“The United States immigration adjudication system is beset with crippling problems. Immigration judges
occupy positions of unhealthy dependence within the Immigration and Naturalization Service[,]...lack
adequate support services, and frequently face debilitating conflicts with agency personnel. Board of
Immigration Appeals members perform appellate functions without job security or statutory recognition.
Long delays pervade the quasi-judicial hearing and appellate process. The availability of further review in
federal courts postpones finality, encourages litigation, and undermines the authority of initial appellate
determinations.” 80

As this section will demonstrate, his words hold true today as it did in 1981.
The government’s decision to increase immigration enforcement has greatly
effected the immigration court system. In 2008, immigration judges in the United States
completed 274,469 removal proceedings. 81 Immigration judges have historically had to
deal with fairly heavy dockets. As Sandra Day O’ Connor wrote in her majority opinion
in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, "the average immigration judge handles about six deportation
hearings per day." Recently, the adjudication of immigration cases have been subject of
serious concerns. Having to deal with difficult caseloads, time constraints and many other
constraints, it has created a cloud of doubt about the “quality of decision-making in the
administrative tribunals” 82 that handle immigration cases. 83
A. Difficult Caseloads
80
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Immigration cases are unusually difficult due to the fact of the ambiguity of
relevant facts. This difficulty creates a great burden for immigration judges and it affects
the way they pass judgment in their cases. One example of an ambiguity that immigration
judges deal with are vague legal standards. For instance, the rule that a deportable
individual may avoid removal from the United States if “removal would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a family member who is a lawful resident
of the United States. 84 With certain vague legal standards such as the one mentioned,
immigration judges face the burdening task of using their own judgement to decide when
it is best appropriate to apply. 85
Another example is when immigration judges have to decide whether to grant
asylum. Individuals who are in the process of being removed from the United States, may
avoid removal if they can establish that they are refugees. The Refugee Act of 1980 and
certain parts that were taken and modified and placed into the INA establishes that “Any
alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States…irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum.” 86 Political Asylum is
an immigration benefit that if granted would lead to permanent residency in the United
States and is based on the applicants ability to show that the they have suffered
“persecution” 87 or have a well founded fear of persecution in their country of origin
because of: race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group or
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political opinion. 88 The facts of what happened in another country are often impossible to
discover and there may be little basis for predictions about what would happen if an
individual were returned to that country. 89 The lack of written evidence relevant to an
asylum decision makes judges especially dependent on their assessment of an alien’s
testimony 90 and thus in the end have to rely on their own judgement whether to grant the
individual asylum.
B. Time Constraints
Immigration judges face extreme pressure to resolve their severe caseloads with
only a limited amount of time.91 From 2000 to 2005, the total immigration caseload
grew substantially with little increase in the number of immigration judges. 92 The total
caseload in 2009 was about the same as it was in 2005. 93 Judges have little staff support;
even with an increase in the number of law clerks, there is still an average of only one
clerk for every four judges. 94 The impact of putting judges in a position in which they
have to balance their goal of making the best possible decision against the goal of simply
getting through the cases. Judges cannot take all the time needed to fully consider the
alternatives in a case. 95 And when caseload pressures are greatest, simply processing
cases may become the dominant goal in decisionmaking.
However, as Michele Benedetto Neitz said in her article, Crisis on the
Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, “even if the reasons for bias or
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incompetence on the part of immigration judges can be understood in the context of
difficult cases and understaffed courts, such behavior violates the norms of judicial
ethics. Judicial neutrality and competence must be prioritized over expedient resolution
of cases.”
Another important shift in the immigration docket in recent years is the rise in the
number of cases in which noncitizens raise allegations of government misconduct in the
course of investigating immigration violations. Unfortunately, unlike state and federal
courts, which have long overseen police activity, immigration courts were not designed to
govern the police. As the Supreme Court noted in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 96 "a
deportation hearing is intended to provide a streamlined determination of eligibility to
remain in this country, nothing more." 97
2. Problems with Immigration Enforcement
Immigrant and civil rights advocates have voiced multiple concerns regarding the
increased coordination between federal agencies and state and local authorities, arguing
that the combination of immigration enforcement with the criminal justice system is
problematic and fraught with error. From the outset, there has been much criticism that
the process of identifying potential noncitizens is laden with racial and ethnic bias, and
that appearance and last names are used as proxies for citizenship to determine who
should be scrutinized.98 In addition, critics argue that given the complexity of
immigration law there is much room for error in the process of identifying potential
noncitizens, and that many individuals who are actually U.S. citizens have had ICE holds
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placed on them.99 In one poignant example, Mark Lyttle, an American citizen who is
bipolar, was deported after signing statements that he was a Mexican citizen, although he
had a valid Social Security number. 100 The growing involvement of immigration
enforcement with the criminal justice system makes it increasingly difficult to track and
challenge the treatments of immigrants. 101
A. 287(g) Agreements
The practice of appointing state and local police to enforce federal immigration
laws has proven to be highly ineffective and dangerous. No case illustrates this better
than that of Pedro Guzman. Pedro Guzman was born in California and was deported to
Mexico because the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office, a 287(g) participant, believing
that he was in the country illegally placed an immigration detainer on him in the local jail
and then transferred him to ICE, which eventually deported him to Mexico. Pedro
Guzman was cognitively impaired and living with his mother before being deported to
Mexico, a country where he had never lived. During his time in Mexico, Pedro Guzman
had no other alternative than to eat out of trash cans and bathe in rivers for several
months. His mother, also a U.S. citizen, took leave from her job to travel to Mexico to
search for her son in jails and morgues. After he was located and allowed to reenter the
U.S., Pedro Guzman was so traumatized that he could not speak for some time. The
illegal deportation of Pedro Guzman occurred in pursuant to the 287(g) MOA between
Los Angeles County and ICE.
Several localities have been sued in recent years due to the arrest and detention of
99
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U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and other immigrants with lawful status.
Officers who make immigration arrests or detain individuals on the street, workplace,
home, or jail will rarely have firsthand evidence of the status of a person. Instead,
assuming there is a lawful basis for a stop or other questioning, the officers will make
judgments about whether the person is a citizen, an immigrant with some other form of
lawful status, or an individual who lacks status altogether.
Often officers will arrest individuals who are U.S. citizens and detain them for
immigration violations or misidentify U.S. citizens in the local jail as noncitizens,
holding and transferring them into immigration custody.
When a question about citizenship arises, however, there is no national database of
citizens to resolve those questions. DHS can only answer questions about people who
have been processed by that agency. Most citizens, however, have never had a file with
DHS. DHS itself has reportedly detained and even deported U.S. citizens despite its own
purported expertise in this area of law. 102 Similarly, local jails that attempt to engage in
screening make the predictable error of issuing detainers on some citizens, improperly
holding them for transfer into immigration custody instead of releasing them.
The structure of the 287(g) program, without careful and constant oversight, can
creates a serious risk of racial and ethnic profiling. As shown by Northeastern University
researchers, who produced a resource guide on racial profiling data collection systems for
the U.S. Department of Justice in November 2000, when police officials have a high
degree of discretion in enforcing laws, it creates the incentive for them to indulge in race
based prejudices. The data shows that “complexities of police discretion emerge more
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often in the high-discretion stop category,” such as traffic stops. 103 “These high-discretion
stops invite both intentional and unintentional abuses. Police are just as subject to the
racial and ethnic stereotypes they learn from our culture as any other citizen. Unless
documented, such stops create an environment that allows the use of stereotypes to go
undetected.” 104
B. Criminal Alien Program
The Criminal Alien Program raises serious civil rights concerns. According to the
study conducted by the Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity and Diversity, using arrest
data obtained from the CAP in Irving, Texas, it concluded that ICE is not following
“Congress’ mandate to focus resources on the deportation of immigrants with serious
criminal histories.” 105 From the arrest data collected, the study discovered that felony
charges accounted for only 2% of ICE detainers issued, while 98% of detainers were
issued for misdemeanor offenses. Thus the report concluded, “This study offers
compelling evidence that the Criminal Alien Program tacitly encourages local police to
arrest Hispanics for petty offenses.” 106 Put simply, the CAP does not focus its resources
on serious offenses as it was originally designed.
The Criminal Alien Program has not accomplished its mission of enhancing public
safety but instead tarnished the trust between immigrant communities and local law
enforcement. As a result it creates a sense of fear in immigration neighborhoods when
they become to afraid to report any crimes because of individual fear of deportation. The
focus of the CAP is to apprehend violent criminals but the majority of the targets
identified through the program are people who were arrested for mere misdemeanor
103
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violations. Although undocumented immigration is a civil violation, immigrants are being
treated and branded as criminals, with deportation as their punishment. CAP does not
distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, between those who are traffic violators
and those who are violent felons, or between victims and aggressors. 107
C. Secure Communities
Advocates have criticized the Secure Communities program because it took place at
the beginning of the criminal process and therefore indiscriminately targeted people
arrested for crimes of all magnitudes, rather than persons convicted of serious crimes. 108
The program also casts too wide net with too few safeguards. By November 2009,
95 cities and counties in eleven states were participating in Secure Communities. In the
first half of 2009, over 266,000 fingerprints were run through the Secure Communities
system, resulting in 32,000 matches. Not every individuals that were identified are
necessarily removable. For example, lawful permanent residents who commit many types
of misdemeanors are not removable but they would come up as matches in the DHS
database. Also, individuals who have been mistakenly arrested and have been put in the
DHS database would also come up as a match. Many critics of the Secure Communties
program have led them to argue that the reach of the program is not adequately tailored to
achieve its primary objective of targeting noncitizens who pose a threat to the
community.
While the stated goal of each of these programs is to target and remove from
communities the most dangerous criminals, data from the 287(g), CAP, and Secure
Communities programs document that, in reality, the majority of individuals targeted are
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identified because of their race or ethnicity and for crimes which do not pose a serious
risk to public safety.
III. Detention Centers
Immigrant rights advocates have expressed concern about the treatment of immigrant
prisoners while in California facilities. First, immigrant prisoners are subjected to
inadequate conditions of confinement. Many immigrants have to suffer with inadequate
healthcare, overcrowding and lack of adequate telephone access, visitation hours,
ventilation, food, clean quarters, and functioning showers and toilets, along with being
put through verbal and physical abuse. 109 Inadequate healthcare has also been a serious
concern. Second, many detainees endure due process violations and hardships arising
from routine transfers to facilities far from where most detainees reside. Transfers have
multiplied with ICE’s expansion of its detainee population and network of facilities:
Because of shortages of detention space in California and the Northeast, ICE transfers
detainees to far-flung locations “where there are surplus beds.” 110 Transfers exacerbate
the problems that invariably arise in detention, disrupting detainees’ ability to present
effective arguments for release and against removal by interfering with attorney-client
relationships, delaying and complicating proceedings, and even changing the applicable
substantive law. 111 In many instances, attorneys and family members have been unable to
locate detainees for extended periods.
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Danilo Cabrera, suffered first hand through unfair treatment in the detention
facilities. Danilo describes his experience at the detention facilities as traumatic. He says
that while he was detained it was almost impossible to contact his lawyer or loved ones
because they kept transporting him from detention facilities to detention facilities. The
first detention facility he was placed in was in Lancaster, California and then two weeks
later he was moved to a detention center in Texas and his last stop was a detention center
in New Mexico. Danilo proclaimed that inside the detention facilities you have no rights.
You are mistreated, verbally abused, and are treated like a criminal. Danilo said that
being locked up in a detention center is tremendous and is something that he would not
even wish on his own enemies. He said for those 45 days that he spent detained will
haunt him for the rest of his life.
Many of the issues surrounding state and local liability for immigration
enforcement have yet to be resolved. Indeed, some of these issues may not be resolved
for many years as immigration enforcement practices change and as cases work their way
through the courts. But the risks for states and localities are very real. These risks must be
considered as states and localities decide whether to take on enforcement of immigration
law.

Conclusion
The ongoing changes in immigration enforcement should not be ignored. This
thesis seeks to show that the current immigration procedures in California is in need of
reform. The current enforcement program encourages racial profiling and the

immigration courts are understaffed and overworked that it is hard for them to adjudicate
proper rulings in cases. Although a full reform plan exceeds the extent of this thesis, I
offer some recommendations in an attempt to fix a faulty system.
First, there needs to be more oversight in the ICE programs. Today, ICE is now the
largest law enforcement agency in the country. By its own estimation, it also works with
tens of thousands of state and local law enforcement officials throughout the country. It
can initiate removal proceedings against over 10 percent of the U.S. population, and its
actions affect countless others. However, ICE has no oversight mechanism that govern its
actions. As ICE becomes a hub for a whole host of state and local law enforcement
efforts, it seems increasingly important to consider the possibility that external oversight
is needed to ensure that constitutional rights are not being violated.
Second, reform is needed in the immigration courts. Immigration courts should
provide counsel to noncitizens because people who have access to immigration legal
experts are better able to understand the types of documentation they need and thus
making their time in court more productive and reducing the number of unnecessary
court hearings. Also, there needs to be an increase in staff because although more cases
are being filed by the DHS to the immigration courts, there are not enough judges or law
clerks to deal with the massive influx. Creating a more effective oversight for
immigration enforcement and changing the nature of the immigration courts are both
necessary steps to ensure that the immigration enforcement in California will function
properly.
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